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TH-E LAW OF' CHARITABLE TRUSTS.
The Law of Charitable Trusts may be called,and justly
so,one of the most interesting subjects,to the public at
large,that could be written upon.
The manifold benefits derived from the many institutions
owing their existence and present sustenance to the provision
and allowances made by the Law of Charitable Trusts,are of
vital and absorbing interest to thc two great classes of the
people-if we classify them,in a general way,on the basis of
circumstances.
To the wealthy,who desire to better the condition of
their less fortunate fellow-men,by donatin to their social
needs some of the suoerflous wealth which they possess,it is
interesting,because the- can do so with a full and perfect
confidence that their wishes and intentions will be sacredly
regarded and carried out,and that the money will be applied
with strict impartiality to the purpose for which it was
given.
To the poor man or boy,who desires to rise to a higher
intellectual life,but has not the means,the Law of Charitable
Trusts distributing through its many agents,the moneys of
good men,builds him a broad and solid road,upon which he may
travel to the Voal of his ambition.
As in the erection of a, bu-ilding,in ordr that the
structure may stand firmlythe foundation must rest upon the
solid bed rock,so in the treatment of this subject,we will go
down to the verz1 bottom of its existence,and commence the
work,by makink an examination;
First-Of the Origin,and Rise of the Law of Trusts in
Ceneral.In nearlyT all of the historical accounts of the Oripi
and Rise of the Law of Trusts,the words Use,and Trust,are
used in a very unsatisfactory and confusing manner.We will
attempt now,in the beginning of this subject,to bring them
out in their proper signification,and attitude toward each
other.There seems to be great confusion as to whether the two
words have the same,or different meanings.To clear this up,we
must observe them from a standpoint of time.
Chancellor Kent says,"Trusts are what Uses were before
the Statute of Uses,so far as they are mere fiduciary
interests distinct from the le_,a1 estate,and to be enforced
only in Equity:.
Lord Henly,in Burgress V.Wheat,I.W!liam Blackstone 180,
said,"That there was no difference,in the principles,between
the Mlodern Trust and the Ancient Use,thou-h there was a wide
difference in the application of those principles.The dif-
ference consists in a more liberal construction of them,and
at the same time,a more guarded care against abuse.'
Nr.Bispham,in his work on EQuity,says,"Defore the Stat-
ute of Usesthere appears to have existed a distinction be-
tween the technical Use,and a Trust.When a, Trust,"says Bacon,
is not special nor transitorybut general 
and permanent,then
it is a Use.The permanent Use was the natural result 
and out-
growth of the special trust?
So we see,that while before the Statute of Uses there
appears to have been a recognized technical difference
between the two terms,since the Statute,while a very slight
technical difference may yet remain,for all intents and pur-
poses,and according to the common legal understanding and
usage,the terms Use and Trust are used interchangeably.
There seems to be a great deal of obscurity surrounding
the origin of uses and trusts,both as to their nature,and the
date of their birth in the English Law.We find writers of
great eminence giving distinctly contradictory theories in
regard to their origin,in their different accounts.
One group of authorities on the subject say,"That while
no exact date can be given for the origin of uses,or as they
were afterwards called,Trusts,we shall find that they existed
in the Roman Law under the name of Fidei Commissa,or trusts.
They were introduced by testators to evade the Municipal
Law which disabled certain personsas Exiles,and Strangers,
from being heirs and legatees.The inheritance or legacy was
given to a person competent to take,in trust,for the person
who was the real object of the testator's bounty.But such a
confidence was a very precarious one,and was called by the
Roman Lawyers Jus Precarium";for it rested entirely on the
good faith of the trustee,who was under no legal obligation
to execute it.To make the patronage of the Emperor in favor
of these defenseless truststhey were created under an appeal
to him,as Rogate Per Salutem.Augustus 
was flattered by the
appeal and directed the Praetor 
to afford a remedy to the
Cestui ciue trust.These fiduciary 
interests increased so fast
after thatthat a special Eqjuity jurisdiction 
was created to
enforce the performance of the trusts.This 
"Particular Chan-
cellor for uses",as Lord Bacon terms him,who 
was charged with
the support of these trusts was called Praetor 
Fidei Commis-
sarius.If the testator recuested a certain person 
to be his
heir,and recuested him,as soon as he should enter upon 
the
inheritanceto restore it to another,(the testator's intended
beneficiary),he was bound to do it. The Emperor Justinian
gave great efficiency to the remedy against the trustee by
authorizing the Praetor,in cases where the trusts could not
otherwise be proved,to make the heir,or any legatee disclose
or deny the trust upon oath,and when the trust appeared to
compel the performance of it.
The English Ecclesiastics,in order to evade the Statutes
of Mortmainborrowed the uses from the Roman Law and intro-
duced them into England in the reign of Edward III.,or Richarr
II. They caused lands to be granted to third persons to the
Use of the Religious houses,and these conveyances,the Cler-
ical Chancellors held to be Fidei Commissa,and binding in
conscience. When tgis evasion of the Law was met and suppres-
sed b:, the Statute of 15 Richard II.,uses were applied to
save lands from the effects of attainder;for the use being a
mere right in Ecuityto the profits of the land,was exempt
from Feudal responsibilities.Uses were afterward applied to a
variety of purposes in the business of civil life,and grew up
into a refined and regular system.
JudFe Story,in speakinE of 
tie origin of trusts,saYsIt
is highly probable,that those 
trusts which are exclusively
cognizable in courts of Equity,were,in 
their originderived
from th( Roman Law,beinV very similar 
in. their nature to the
Fidei Commissa of that Law."
The other group of authorities referred 
togive a, direct
opposite theory in regard to the origin 
and rise of Uses and
Trusts.They hold that there is a broad distinction between
trusts and the Fidei Commissa,which has been 
pointed out by
hiph authorit .We will proceed to consider, them.
In X4cDonouvh's Executors V.Murdock,15 Howard 367,the
question arose,whether a trust was within the language of the
Louisiana Code prohibiting Substitutionsand Fidei Commissa,
and it was held by the court that it was not.
The material difference between the two is obvious from
a, consideration of the Fidei Commissa as they existed under
the Roman Law. The Fidei Commissum,as has been stated,was the
means employed to carry oit substitutions which could not
otherwise be affected b - the testator.EPv a substitution,a
party could be appointed to take the inheritance in case the
person who was desi'ned as heir in the first instance,did not
make his election to accept the inheritance within a speci-
fied time,or in case he was a descendant of the testator,and
after becoming heirdied under puberty.
I. Commentaries of Caius,Sec.176,180.
Ifhowever,a stranger,and not a descendant was institute
as heir,a Substitution could not be made in such a way that
if the heir died within a specified timesome other person
should be heir to him.But this end was affected by means of
the Fidei Commissumwhereby the 
heir was bound to deliver the,
inheritance over to the beneficiary,in 
whole or in partat,or
after a designated time.
II.Gaius Commentaries, Sec.18
4 .
The transmission of estates to be enjoyed 
by successive
owners,was accomplished by means of the Fidei 
Commissa.It is
also to be noted,that while in both of these estates,there
was presumed to exist a confidential relationship,in 
the
Fidei Commissum,it was presumed to exist in order to 
transmit
the inheritance,while in the trust it exists to regulate the
present enjoyment of the estate in the trust.
Having thus considered the substance of the Fidei Com-
missum,and the Modern Trust,we see that there are two main
points of difference between the two.First,-That the Fidei
Commissum arose out of testamentary dispositions;,whereas the
English Trust was created only by conveyances Inter Vivos,
since land could not be devised before the Statute of Henry
VIII.,or the Statute of Wills. Second,-That in the Fidei Com-
misstm,there was no separation of the legal and Equitable
title;there was nothing but a. recuest,which afterward became
a duty imposed upon the heir to convey the inheritance to an-
other person,either immediately,or after the death of the
first taker.While in the case of the trust,a perfect owner-
ship is decomposed into its constituent elements of legal
title,and beneficial interest,whteh are vested in different
persons at the same time.
We have now considered very carefully,the two Wreat theories
advanced as to the origin of the Law of Trustsand from the
distinct stands taken by each set of authorities it is a
very difficult, matter to formula/re a moderate theory. I am
inclined,however,to take in the main,the theory of the
second class of authorities cited,among whom is :tr.2ispham.It
can be seen,that the Fidei Commissum,and the Trust,may,in
their mere superficial idea,be similar,yet when we consider
carefully the nature of the estate,,and the different pur-
poses that they are designed to carry out respectively,that
they are entirely separate and distinct. I am very strongly
of the opinion that they are indigenous to England,and owe
their existence to the brain and cunning of some of the early
Clergylearned in the Law,as many' of them were at that period
of the history of England; and furthermore,that they do not
come from the 1oma-. Law,since the only Foman Law that could
have influenced England,was the Old Roman Law.
The cuestion as to the approximate date,of the origin of
Trustsis also a difficult one.Some authorities claim that
trusts existed in the time of King Alfred,but the better
opinion seems to be that the instance referred to,was the
description of a tenureand not the case of a trust.It is
highly probable that trusts were recognized some time before
the Statute of Quia Emptores,(13 Edward I),and became very
common after that date.As a safe date,we may assumeaccording
to Mr.2igelow,"That in the Reign of Edward III.,the benefi-
cial enjoyment of land,as distinguished from the leocal owner-
shipwas distinctly recognized.
We have so far,made a historical consideration of 
the
Law of Trusts from the date of their oripginup almost 
to the
present time,we will now proceed to make a technical discus-
sion of the same,and this connection,the first thing 
to be
considered is,what is a trust? Here we ":ave a variety of
definitions by different authors,differing some what in their
wording,and to a small degrec in their scope,but all of them
expressing the same main idea,some of which we will now give.
Lord Coke,in describing the nature of a Use or Trust in
land according to the Common Law,uses the fol owing language,
"A Use is a truLst or confidence reposed in some other,which
is not issuing out of the land,but as a thing collateral,an-
nexed in privity to the estate of the land,and to the person,
touching the land-that is,that the Cestui cue Use shall take
the.profit,and that the terre tenant shall make an estate
according to his direction.
Story Equity J.P-,Sec.968.
Lord Hardwick,in Stuart V.'Mellish, 2 Atkinson,612,held
that a Trust is,where there is such a confidence between the
parties,that no action at Law wil' lie;but is im.erely a case
for the consideration of the Court of Euity.
Story Erduity J.P.,page 295,note 1.
In Mr.Snell's Work on Eruity we find the following defi-
nition of a trust." A trust is a beneficial interest in,or a
beneficial ownership of,real or personal property,unattended
with the legal ownership thereof'.' Snell E.J.P. page 59.
Judge Story in his Work on Ecuity gives I think,the most
comprehensive and brief definition of a trust that I have
been able to find,and is as follows,"A trust is,in the most
enlarged sense,in which that term is used in English Juris-
prudence,may be dtfined to be an e-uitable right,title,or
interest in propertyireal or personal,distinct from the leg-
al ownership thereof."
Trusts in general may be classified under three heads:-
Express Trusts;Implied Trusts;and Constructive Trusts.
Those falling under the head of Exprfss Trussts,may be
again sub-divided,according to their objects,or their end and
purpose into,Express Private Trusts;and Express Public,or
Charitable Trusts.
It is with Express Public or Charitable Trusts,that we
have to do with in the present investigation.
It was formerly supposed that Charitable trusts owed
their origin to the Statute of Charitable Uses,43 Elizabeth,
C.4.,which was in fact an act designed for the sole purpose
of picking out charities which were already in existence,and
providing for their proper enforcement.This statute,because
it enumerated agreat ,nan,, objects that were charitable, came
in the course of time,to be considered the origin of the jur4
isdiction of the Curt of Chancery over Charitable Trusts.
This opinion was held in both England and the United States,
until as late as 1844,when the great case of Vidal 7.Cirard's
Executors was decided,and in the arguments in that case,the
error was shown.
In that case,one of the learned Counsel,in his argument,
by references to the proceedings of the Court of Chancery in
the time of Queen Elizabethdenonstrated the fact that that
Court had exercised jurisdiction over trusts of this descrip-
tion,prior to the passage of the Statute of Charitable Uses.
10,
The cases were few in number and some of them ver-, unsat-
isfactory, as examples of charitable uses, but upon the
authority of these precedents, it is now a well settled
fact that the jurisdiction of chancery over charitable
uses does not depend upon the" STATUTE", but was in ex-
istence independently of, and prior to, its enactment.
Henry VIII. in his struggle with the Pope was oblig-
bd to attack and destroy many charitable institutions,
for the purpose of asserting the supremacy of the Crown
over the authority of the Pope. To do this many statutes
were passed abolishing charitable institutions. The Abbies,
Monasteries and other religious houses were the objects
aimed at, but a number of the acts applied to colleges,
chapels, schools and hospitals. In the short reign of
Edward VI. and the bloody reign of Philip II. and Piary
these abuses multiplied and piled themselves one upon tb.
other. After the acession of Elizabeth to the thvown and
the Reformation was established, attention was at once
turned to the correction of these abuses and the encour-
agement of charities, and several important statutes
were passed for the purPose of so doing: As for instance
39 Eliz. Chap. 6. which authorized the Queen to appoint
a commission to enquire if grants or gifts to hospitals
and other charitable uses were misemployed, and if so, to
correct such abuses. Another, 43 Eliz. C. 2, was the found-
ation of the poor laws of England and from them probably
originated the Paupri' Laws in Porce in Tan- of the states
of this country. All of these stati-tes culminated in the
statute,43 Elixabeth,C.4,known as the Statute of Chari-
1.
table Uses. The question as to the 6rip=in of the ,uris-
diction of the Court oC Chancery has great practical im-
portance for the reasonthat where the statute of Elizabeth
is not ii force,or has not been adopted,the right of courts
of Equity to assume control over ,uestions of this kind
must depend upon their original jurisdiction.
Let us consider the question,as to what is a charity
as comprehended under charitable uses. >!r.Binney,one of
the counsel in the great Girard Will case,2 Howard,128,
defined a Charity to be,"What ever is given for the love
of God,or for the love of your neighbor,in the Catholic
and universal sense- given from these motives and to these
ends- free from the stain or taint of every consideration
that is personal,-private,or selfish.' This definition has
been approved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvaniain the
case of Price V.AIaxwell,4 Caseyo,35,which was the case of
where a. devise to a school under the auspices and control
of a religious denomination,and confined t, the youth of
its members,both rich and poor,was held a devise to a
charitable useand it was held that it did not cease to
be a charitable use because it extended to the rich as
well as the roor,Judge Lewis,citing and approving the
definition of Mr.Pinney in 2 Howard 128.
Lord Camden,in the case of Jones V.Wi!liams,where
a testator left a sum of money to a city for the purpose
of bringing good water to it for the public use,and for
keeping the public fountains in repair,formu.ated the
following definition, "A charity is a gift to a. general




This is a, definition of great clearness 
and brevity
and has been adopted by such high authorities as 
the Sup-
reme Court of the United States,in Perin V.Carey,24 How.
506,and also br Chancellor Kent,in the case of Coggeshall
V.Pelton,7 Johnson's Chancery,294,where a tFstator,
William Henderson,left, a sum of money to the town of New
Rochelle,for the purpose of building a town house for
the transacting of town business,the Chancellor held the
bequest to he a valid charitable trust,since it was for
the poor as well as the rich.
In Jachson V.Phi1lips,14 Allen,555,Justice Gray in
the opinion said,"That a charity in its legal sense,was
a gift,to be applied consistently with existing laws,for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons,either by
bringing their minds or their hearts under the influence
of education or religion,-by relieving their bodies from
disease,suffering,-or constraint,by assisting them to es-
tablish themselves in life,or by erecting and maintain-
ing public buildings or works,or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government.It is immaterial whether the pur-
pose is called charitable in the gift itself,if it is so
described as to show that it is charitable in its nature.'
The Statute of 43 ElizabethC.4.,points out the ex-
act things which are held to be charitable in their use
in the law.It is real1 y a syllabus of charities. The uses
comprehended under the Statute,are set forth in the pre-
amble,and are as follows:-"The relief of'aged,and impot-
ent,and poor people;the maintenance of sick and wounded
soldiers and mariners;schools of learning;free 
schools;
houses of correction;repairs of bridges;ports,havens, 
cause-
WVayTS,sea, banks,and highways;the education and preferrme~t
of orphans;the marriages of poor maids;supportation 
and
help of tradesmen;handicraftsmen, persons decaujed;the 
re-
lief or redemption of prisoners and captives;in aid 
or
ease of any poor inhabitants concerning the payment of
fifteenths,setting out of soldiers,and other taxes". Gifts
for any of these purposes were charitable. In addibion to
these objects expressly provided for,by the express let-
ter of the Statutethere were a number of similar objects
which were held to be within the spirit of the ststute,
as tending to assist in carrying out its main intent and
object,and were therefore held to be charities,and enfor-
ced as such. As for example,a gift for the repairing of a
church.
From our consideration of the foregoing authorities
and cases,we can with some degree of certainty,classify
charitable trusts under four heads,or classes:-
(1).ducational Purposes- This class would in-
clude all trusts for the founding,endowing,and support-
ing of schools and other similar institutions which are
not strictly private. This class is illustrated in the
case of Donohgh's Appeal,l W.N.C.(2 com.pleas,Phila.)196.
In this case there was a provision of the Pennsylvania
constitution involved. The Constitution of Pennsylvania
exempted from taxation,institutions of purely public
charity,and the question was,whether the library company
of Philadelphia fell within the phrase. Judge Mitchell
13.
14.
held that it did. For Libraries and other Literary insti-
tutions as the above cited case illustrated.
(2).Benevolent purposes;trjists fot the poor,
the ver7, poor,the widows and orphans of a specified town.
The case of In Fe Williams,well illustrates this class
Here a be uest was left for the purposes of keeping in
repair certain tombs,and the residue was to be accumulat-
ed and when it reached twenty-five pounds,when it was to
be given to the poor of the parish until the surplus was
redtced to twenty pounds.The first part of the beqtest
failed,and was held that the whole income went to the
object which was charitable.
In Re Williams,5 L.R.Chan.Division,735.
(3).Relivious lurposes,as for instance,the prop-
agation and supnort of religion,the advancement of Christ-
ianity among the Infidels,or the maintaining of Divine
worship. The case of DeCamp V.Dobbin,29 New Jersey Equity
36,is,I think,in point as an il lustration of this head.
This was the case where a provision in the will of a
testator read as follows:-"The residue of my estate I
give and devise to the North Reformed Church of Newark,
in trust,that they may use the same to promote the reli-
gious interests of the said church,-and to 'aid the mis-
sionary,educational,and benevolent; enterprises to which
the said church is in the habit of contributingwas held
to be a good charitable becuest.
(4).Gifts for erecting or maintaining public
buildings and works,or otherwise lessening the burdens
of governi-ent,provided that the subject of the trust is
a gift and not the result of a. contract,for in the lat-
ter case it would be held not to be charity,since it woid
not be based on bounty as a charity m-,iust niecessarily be.
I now think,frum the results of our investigation,
we have a fair idea of the nature of the objects which
partake of the bounty of charitable trusts. We will there-
fore proceed to consider some of the leadinp, character-
istics,of charitable trusts by which they are specially
distinguished from ordinary trusts.
Charity,from its very essence,is for the ma.nyand
not the few,and in order that it may adecquately care for
the needs of all those who seek its help,it should con-
tinue for all time.
Therefore,in Charitable Trusts,which are designed
to carry out the inatents and purposes of charity,we find
two main characteristics:-
(!).That charitable trusts are entirely unaf-
fected by the rules against perpetuities and accumulations.
In this connection,we know,that as to perpetuities and
accumulations,the law wi1  not allow them in the case of
a trust,-any more than it wil- in the case of an individ-
ual,but in the case of charit,7,t-- law has relaxed its
severity,and in a trust for charity,property may remain
in the hands and under the control of the trustees,and
their successors for all time,since,as we have stated
before,the object of charity is that it T-ay be perpetual.
In the case of Odell V.Odel!,1O,Alen,1,An annual income
was left to trustees for the term of fifty years,to be
by them invested and accumulatediand then applied to a
charity. The bequest was here held good,even though it
i6.
was on the face of it,a perpetuity -
The court may,if nesessary and expedient,sell some
of the property and invest the proceeds in some other
form,or in the case of an institution of any kind,as a
schoul,it may remove it to some other location. BuU
during all of this,the trust is Continuous.
We will now proceed 4o consider the second charac-
teristic of charitable rTrusts;that is,the generalitI' and
uncertainty of the objects or beneficiaries. In the or-
dinary trusts,these must be stated with great clearness
and precision. But in Charitable trusts,they need only
be state with sufficient clearness and precision,To show
that the testator had a, charitable intent,and to enable
the court by means of well settled doctrines,to carry the
intent into effect. But since this is clearly explained
and set forth in the well known doctrine of Equityfcalled
the "Cy Pres"doctrine,we will now proceed to make a care-
ful consideration of that doctrine.
In England,the doctrine of Cy Pres,.was administered
two ways. It was applied bl the Chancellor personally;
exercising a prerogative of the King under the sign manual
of the Crown;or;in the second place,the Chancellor ap-
plied it judicial 1yeas the Chancellor of the court of
EU ty.
In all cases where a testator died and left a be-
quest the intent of which was charitable,and mentioned
no beneficiaries,or no trustees to carry it out; or,where
the object of the charity failed;the chancellor would,
inst ead of allowing the bequest to revert to the heir-at-
17.
law,apply it to some charity,,for which he considered it
d
was intened in a peneral wayi by the testator. Where Uhe
chancellor applied the Cy Pres doctrine personally,it was
really an exercise of the executive,rather than the judi-
cial authorityand through a misunderstanding in this
countryfof the fact that the doctrine is not exercised
in that manner here,it has been severely criticised and
has been adopted less generally by the different states
than it should,and otherwise might have been.
In this country,however,we have none but what is
known as the pure judicial Cy Pres doctrine. This doctrine
as stated by M4r.Bispham,is as follows:- "where a gift is
made to trustees for a charitable purpose,the general
nature of which is pointed out,and which is lawful and
valid,at the time of the death of the testator,and no
intention is expressed to limit it to a particular in-
stitution,,or mode of application;and afterwards,either
by change of circumstances the scheme of the testator
becomes impracticable,or by change of law,becomes illegal,
the fund having once vested in the charityidoes not go
to the heirs-at-lawas a resulting trustibut is to be
applied by the court of chanceryin the exercise of its
Jurisdiction in E3uity,as near the testator's particular
directions as possible,to carry out his general charitable
intent".
A good example of this doctrine is found in the case
of The Attorney-General V.the Ironmonger's CompanyII.M.
and K.,576. Here,one Thomas Bettonin the residuary clause
of his willmade in 1725,bec ueathed the residue of his
1.3.
estate to the Ironmonger's Company,of London,as trustees
forbidding them to diminish the capital thereof,or to ap-
ply the interest or profits in any other waythan the one
mentioned. He directed them to apply one-half of the in-
come to the redemption of British slaves in Turkey,or
Barbary. Of the other one-half,he be ueathed one-fourth
to the Ironmonger's Company for the maintenance of a
minister to carry on Divine worship,and the remaining
one-fourth,to found charitable schools in London. The
half beq ueathed to the purpose of freeing slaves in Turkey
and Barbary,failed in the -main,for the want of benefi-
ciaries,as there were few,if any slaves to free. The
question was,then,what was to be done with the property.
In the decision of the case on the trial,the Chancellor
held that the court could disburse the money in a manner,
and as near the apparent intentions of the testator as
possible. 4-e held that the character of charity was im-
pressed on the whole fund;the presumed intention of the
testator was,that if one object failed,it was to be ap-
plied to some similar object,in order to carry out the
charitable intent of the testator; it was therefore ap-
plied to the establishment of charitable schools in parts
of England and Wales,that being considered a carrying
out of the testator's intentionsince he did not limit
in his will,the first moiety to the poor of London.
In America,and as a whole,upon the entire subject,
the greatest case is that of Jackson V.Phillips,14 Allen
539,at page 530.
19.
In this case,Francis Jackson,of Boston,bequeathed to
Williaii Lloyd Garrison,Wendell Phillips,Edmund Quincy,
and other~,as trustees,the sum of ten thousand dollars,
to use and expend at their discretion,without responsi-
bility to any one,in such sums,at such times,and such
places as they deemed best,preparation and circulation
of books,newspapers,the delivery of speeches,lectures,
and such other means,as in their judgement,would create
a public sentiment that would put an end to Negro slavery
in this country.
He further bequeathed the sum of two thousand dol-
lars to the same trustees,for the benefit of fugutive
slaves who might escape from the slaveholding states. He
expressed his desire that the trustees would become a
permanent organization,and gave them power to appoint their
successors. These provisions mentioned in the will were
valid before the war, but when slavery was abolished,the
objects failed. The executors filed a bill in equity,ask-
ing for instructions in regard to the disposition of the
trust estate. The court,in an ppinion bi Judge Crayhelq,
that these charitable bequests were not terminated by the
failure of the objLect expressed b, the testator in his
will,but were to be applied to carry out in a lawful man-
ner,the intentions of the testatoras nearly as possible,
according to a scheme to be settled by a master in chan-
ceryand approved by the court,before the funds were paid
over to the trustees;and that upon the return of the mas-
ter's report,both sums should be paid over to such trus-
tees.
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The firs, amount was to be raid by them,from time to
time,to an association,already established,to promote the
educationgsupport,and interests of the freedmen,latel
slavesin those states in which slavery had been abolished,
to be expended for that object. The amount of the seconid
bequest,was paid to the use of needy persons of African
descent,in Boston and its vicinity,preference being given
to such ones as had escaped from slavery. In the opinion
the court reviews and discusses the entire question of
of
charities many which propositions have been stated In th
preceding part of this thesis.
The doctrine of Cy Pres,also applies to a residuary
gift for charities. It was so held in the case of Mayor
of Lyons V.The Attorney General of Bengal,L.R.1 Appeals
cases,91.
We might cite a large number of cases on the subject
of the Cy Pres doctrine,but as we have but a limited space
and time,we must proceed with our investigation, since I
think we have given sufficient to make perfectly clear
the general nature and scope of the doctrine.
If the gift is for a charity generally,it must be
made to trusteesso that the court wil1 not have to act
as a trustee;but the gift wil. not be al-owed to fail for
the want of a trustee.
The Cy Pres doctrine has been adopted in some states
and repudiated in others. In North CarolinaIndiana,Iowq,
Alabama,and New York, it has been repudiated. In Pennsyl-
vaniawhile the principles of the Statute of Elizabeth
were adopted,the Cy Pres doctrine was not, but the prin-
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ciples have to a limited extent,been adopted by statute.
The most inotable instance of the repudiation of the Cy
Pres doctrine in this country,was in the case of Tilden
V.Green,130,-N.Y.,39. Samuel J.Tilden by his will,bejueath-
ed his residuary estate to Aessrs.Bigelow,dreen and Smith,
hisiexecutort,as trusteesto hold the same during a period
not exceeding two lives in being,and to apply the same to
certain objects specified in the will.
These objects were,that the trustees were to pro-
cure the incorporation of an institution to be known as
the "Tilden Trust",with capacity to establish and main-
tain a free library and reading room, in the city of New
York,and to promote such scientifis and educational pur-
poses as they shall designate. He authorized the trustees
in case such institution was incorporated during the life
time of the survivor Of the two lives specified,to con-
vey and apply to its use,the residuary estate,or so much
of it as they should deem expedient. In case the institu-
tion was not incorporated during the period limited,"or
if for any reason the trustees should deem it inexpedient
to so convey or apply the residueor any part of it','they
were authorized to apply the whole or such portion as was
not so applied,to such charitable educational purposes a
in their judgement would render it,"most widely benefi-
cial to mankind". In the opinion of the court by Judge
Brown,with dissenting opinions on the part of three of
the justices,the gift was declared void for the uncertainty
of the beneficiaries;the court holding that the doctrine
of Cy Pres.was not nor never had' been recognized in the
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in the state of Pew York.
In the New England states,the doctrine has ,uite
kenera 1 ]3 a.dopted,or is now an open uestion. ,issouri
and Illinois have adopted the doctrine,and IPew Jersey has
not yet passed upon the question.
In ';aryland,Virginia,New York,South Carolina,trusts
are governed and exist solely b virtue of statuteand in
conclusion,we will consider trusts under the statutes in
those states. To the above states we should add,Michigan,
Yfisconsin,Miinnesota,and West Virginia.
In these states it may be stated as the correct and
only possible rule on the subject,that a trust having
for its object some charity,if it possessed all of the
essential elements of a valid ordinary private trust,-
namely;a trustee certainand competent to hold,and benefi-
ciaries certain,or capable of being made certain,would
be upheld and properly enforced. In other words,an ex-
press trust otherwise valid,would not become invalid,be-
cause the ultimate purpose was charitable.
Finis.
